

## From Rescue to Preventive Archaeology: A Highly Challenging 25 Years in the Former Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe

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### **Abstract**

*Until the 1990s and the collapse of socialist/communist regimes in Eastern Europe, archaeological institutions and cultural heritage protection practices were fully in the hands of state bodies, which received funds from the state budget. The 'polluter pays' principle was only occasionally applied and was not normally aimed at providing complete coverage of the costs of archaeological protection. There were no clear and stable preventive strategies, since the role of archaeological protection services was mostly one of 'reacting' to newly discovered heritage rather than providing a presence in the initial phases of spatial planning and development. There were many reasons for this, not all of them the result of the fact that the ruling socialist regimes were highly centralised and bureaucratised; the prevailing culture, earlier traditions of state rule, and cultural attitudes towards the past and to heritage also played their part. In socialist countries, all elements of public life were subject to control and planning; and since culture and heritage were considered to have special value for society, they could not be left to operate autonomously. The political and economic changes after 1990 have had very different consequences in different countries in relation to the development of preventive archaeology, and even countries which shared similar or even identical systems of heritage protection organisation and practice (e.g. the former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union) soon developed quite different systems, which ranged from 'very liberal' to 'fairly conservative'. In this respect, it is interesting to note that it was 'liberal' systems of heritage protection that adopted a greater number of preventive archaeology concepts, coupling them with the emergence of a private market in archaeological services, while countries with 'conservative' systems openly (or in a more disguised form) expressed opposition to preventive strategies, and particularly to the engagement of private archaeological enterprise. The two conjunctures – a more 'liberal' preventive heritage approach and the development of a private market in heritage services – are not necessarily directly correlated (e.g. as in preventive archaeology in France), but this correlation seems higher in the case of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. However, if one looks at the range of experiences over the last two decades, a further set of questions suggests itself: who participates in the preventive archaeology market as a private entrepreneur, what is their status and what is the extent of their participation? Are we talking about real entrepreneurs or*

*about public institutions in disguise? Does the dominant role of public institutions (e.g. INRAP in France) secure better quality and control? And what are, in the end, the benefits for heritage, for preventive archaeology professionals, for the public and for our knowledge of the past?*

**Keywords:** preventive archaeology, former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, archaeological services, Valletta Convention, rescue archaeology

### **Povzetek**


Vse do začetka devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja in konca socialističnih oziroma komunističnih režimov v "vzhodnih" evropskih državah je bila dejavnost varovanja kulturne dediščine, vsa praksa in vse ustanove, v celoti v rokah državnih ustanov in teles, ki so morala v državnem proračunu načrtovati izdatke za izvajanje varstva dediščine. Načelo, da stroške varovanja plača 'onesnaževalec' (stran, ki ogroža dediščino), je bilo zelo redko in uporabi pa še takrat ni pokrivalo vseh stroškov arheološkega dela. Večji del prakse arheološke konservatorske službe je bila v glavnem razumljen kot reakcija na novo odkrite objekte dediščine, kajti jasnih in trdnih preventivnih strategij, ki bi bile del prostorskega planiranja, ni bilo. Razlogov za to je več in niso vsi izhajali iz centralizirane in birokratizirane narave socialističnih režimov, temveč tudi iz prevladujoče kulture administriranja in starejših tradicij upravljanja z državo. V socialističnih režimih so bili vsi elementi družbenega življenja podvrženi nadzoru in načrtovanju in ker sta bila kultura in dediščina razumljeni kot posebni vrednosti, se nista mogli bolj avtonomno organizacijsko razvijati. Politične in ekonomske spremembe, ki so nastale po l. 1990, so na področju varovanja kulturne dediščine imele različne posledice v različnih državah in celo državah, ki so imele skupne ali zelo podobne sisteme varovanja dediščine (npr. države nekdanje Jugoslavije ali Sovjetske zveze) so kmalu pričele razvijati zelo različne sisteme varstva, ki so varirali od zelo "liberalnih" do dokaj "konzervativnih". V tem kontekstu je zanimivo pripomniti, da so "liberalni" sistemi bili bolj odprti za koncepte sodobne preventivne arheologije in so dokaj hitro razvili tudi tržišče zasebnih arheoloških storitev, medtem ko so države, ki so ohranile "konzervativne sisteme" (tudi v bolj zakriti obliki) marsikdaj težko sprejemale preventivne strategije, predvsem pa sistemsko angažiranje zasebnih ponudnikov storitev na tem področju. Ti dve konjunkturi – "liberalnejši" sistem preventivnega varstva in razvoj zasebnega sektorja v dejavnostih varstva arheološke dediščine – nista nujno v neposredni korelaciji, o čemer priča oorganizacija in praksa preventivne arheologije v Franciji, se pa zdi ta korelacija precej večja v nekdanjih "vzhodnih" državah. Če se ozremo na različne izkušnje preventivne arheologije v zadnjih dveh desetletjih, se moramo dotakniti še nekaterih drugih vprašanj: kdo, v kakšnem statusu in do katere stopnje, je udeležen na tržišču preventivne arheologije kot zasebnik; ali gre za pravo zasebno dejavnost ali pa za "zakrite" oblike delovanja javnih ustanov; ali prevladujoča vloga javnih ustanov (npr. INRAP v Franciji) jamči boljšo kvaliteto in nadzor nad preventivnimi raziskavami; in, navsezadnje, kaj je dodana vrednost preventivne arheologije za dediščino, za profesionalce v preventivni arheologiji in javnot, ter kakšen in kolikšen je bil prispevek preventivne arheologije za naše poznavanje preteklosti.

In the three most frequently cited publications dealing with preventive archaeology in Europe (Ernyey-Bozók 2007; Schlanger & Aitchison 2010; Guermandi & Salas-Rossenbach 2013) only seven former socialist countries are represented (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia, Czech Republic Russia). Not only that there are very few information on other 15 countries (all members of the Council of Europe), but also most of the existing information which came from the papers

presented at the EPAC meeting in Vilnius, 2004 (Ernyey-Bozóki 2007) need to be ajourned in order to explore and reflex the present state of preventive archaeology in former socialist countries.

Owing to their previously uncompetitive economies and outdated technological infrastructure, most former socialist countries of Eastern Europe still remain largely underdeveloped. Only a handful of Central European countries increased their GDP from 40 to 60% of the EU-15 average between 1990 and 2014, while others (Balkan countries and former Soviet republics) did not reduce the relative distance at all, with their GDP on average remaining at less than 15% of the EU-15 average. These figures should not be ignored when examining preventive archaeology in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. While it is true that the economics of preventive archaeology should primarily be observed within national economies, certain aspects also require consideration within an international context.

Prior to the 1990s, all heritage services in socialist Eastern Europe were the domain of public/state institutions, and the overall structure and practice of the discipline was dominated to a great extent by central academic institutions (see Fig. 1).



*Fig. 1. Standard model of the hierarchy of archaeological disciplines in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe.*

National academic institutes were responsible for general strategic decisions and for developments and practices in scientific disciplines, archaeology included; these institutes were also the most well-resourced in terms of staff, equipment and funds. There was also another important issue, and one that is frequently overlooked elsewhere in Europe: that of the considerable restrictions placed on mobility. Here, it was the institutes' staff who had a much greater chance of obtaining permits to travel abroad and collaborate with their Western colleagues. This privilege was very rare for archaeologists working in regional or local institutions.

In general, it can be said that rescue archaeology served two main goals: a) to protect heritage and b) to serve scientific/academic archaeology by providing new data and, if necessary, assisting in major field projects. For decades it was the institutes that were normally in charge of the largest rescue projects, while local or regional heritage protection services assisted them with staff and infrastructure, and administrative support. This practice (one may also call it a system) to a large degree existed in all former socialist countries of Eastern Europe; moreover, this way of working persisted for decades, which means that it has continued to leave a strong mark on the understanding and practice of preventive archaeology even a quarter of a century after the arrival of political and social change. The view that preventive archaeology needs to serve academic goals and agendas, and that the leading academic institutions should have significant power in this field, is still a fairly current one. Some variations of this model did exist: in Hungary, for example, county museums were in charge of a great deal of rescue work, but always ceded a certain amount of control to the leading academic institutions when large sites were endangered.

However, one should also examine this fact from another perspective, that of funding. On the one hand, funding from national research schemes was in constant decline, particularly in the 1990s, and many large academic institutes and similar organisations had to compensate for the considerable loss of income in order to retain staff and keep projects running. Much of this compensation came from the more direct involvement of these institutes in preventive archaeology. Indeed, in some countries (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria), these institutes are still listed as having a near-monopoly on running preventive projects, in agreement with the national heritage protection service.

However, not all post-socialist countries have followed this path in relation to preventive archaeology. While Slovenia and Croatia, for example, have retained national academic institutes as their paramount research organisations, these institutes have rarely, if at all, been engaged in directing preventive archaeology projects themselves; and in the Baltic countries, which lacked such institutes in the Soviet era, preventive archaeology has become the domain of the national heritage protection service with its own institutions. Special case is Hungary where county museums

for short period of time in the last ten years lost its traditional monopoly to national institutions aimed at preventive research but soon regained it (see more in papers of Czifra & Fábián, and Ernyey-Bozóki *this volume*).

## La Valletta Convention

The adoption of the La Valletta Convention by the Council of Europe in 1992 coincided with the end of the socialist systems of Eastern Europe. Its ratification began in 1993, with most former socialist countries ratifying it over the following 10 to 15 years (for dates of adoption and ratification of the convention see Fig. 5 in Stäuble (2013).

It is difficult to discern any particular pattern regarding the time of adoption or ratification and, as will soon become clear, the effects of this Convention, and the development and practical implementation of preventive archaeology, have varied greatly from country to country (although this has been the case with all national archaeological heritage frameworks throughout Europe). Political and economic changes since 1990 have had very different consequences for preventive archaeology in different countries, and even countries which shared similar or even identical systems of heritage protection organisation and practice (e.g. the former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union) soon developed quite different systems, which ranged from 'very liberal' to 'fairly conservative'.

Socialism (pre-La Valletta)	Capitalism (Post-La Valletta)
<b>LEGISLATION</b>	
Protection of archaeological heritage defined chiefly in conservation acts issued by the culture ministry	Protection of archaeological heritage also required in spatial planning acts as compulsory impact research (various national models)
<b>FUNDING</b>	
Public only (budgets)	Combined: 'polluter pays', public (to a lesser degree)
<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	
Rescue and salvage excavations (mostly)	Wider variety: testing, sampling, preventive excavations, salvage excavations (very rare)
<b>QUALITY CONTROL AND STANDARDS FOR PREVENTIVE ARCHAEOLOGY</b>	
'Standards' derived from academic practice, (frequently not explicit)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regulation and standards adopted for preventive archaeology; most detailed (Slovenia), less detailed and explicit (e.g. Slovakia, Czech Republic...)</li> <li>2. No standards, no new regulations (e.g. Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina)</li> </ol>

**PRACTITIONERS**

Public institutions only:  
Academy, Museums, Heritage services,  
Universities

1. Only limited to public institutions (e.g. Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro...)
2. Public institutions mostly (e.g. Hungary)
3. Hybrid: private SMEs as subcontractors of public institutions (e.g. Czech Republic)
4. Market: private SME and public inst. compete on equal basis (e.g. Slovenia, Croatia, Poland, Slovakia...)

*Fig. 2. Comparison of rescue and preventive archaeology.*

It is interesting to note that it was 'liberal' systems of heritage protection that adopted a greater number of preventive archaeology concepts, coupling them with the emergence of a private market in archaeological services, while countries with 'conservative' systems, openly or in a more disguised form, expressed opposition to a number of preventive strategies and forms of organisation (and particularly to the engagement of private enterprise), insisting that preventive archaeology had to remain largely the domain of public institutions.

These two conjunctures – the 'liberal' preventive heritage approach and the development of a free market in heritage services – are not necessarily directly correlated (e.g. as in preventive archaeology in France), but this correlation seems higher in the case of former 'Eastern' countries.

The economic conditions referred to at the beginning of this paper and recent crisis had an important effect on the development and practice of preventive archaeology. The reduction in national funds posed a considerable challenge to the entire infrastructure of the discipline (institutes, museums, universities, the public heritage service, etc.). The public sector, including the archaeological sector, was quite unprepared for the rapid privatisation and economic liberalisation being advocated by the newly elected governments and by the Western international economic and political powers. In these conditions, the perspectives for preventive archaeology would have been rather bleak without the Valletta Convention. While one can criticise it from many points of view today, for a great many former socialist countries the Convention has played a crucial role in developing preventive archaeology and introducing it into spatial planning, notwithstanding the fact that this process has been a fairly painstaking one.

National administrative traditions (or rather, attitudes towards the administration of cultural heritage and the practices associated with cultural heritage research and protection) have exerted a much stronger influence than one might have expected.

This is not only the result of 50 years of socialist administration, but is also associated with the general idea of the role of state in the countries concerned. With the exception of Russia, all other former socialist countries of Eastern Europe gained their independence at some point in the last 140 years (after the Berlin Congress in 1878 or after the First World War) and some much later, in the 1990s. Given the relatively short period of independence enjoyed by these countries and the fact that almost all of them were actually established after periods of war, the idea of the state as the paramount regulator (direct or indirect via national institutions) of all principal public and national assets, heritage included, remains very strong – hence the culture of administration in many countries is still associated with these assets.

### **Transition from rescue to preventive archaeology**

In Western as well as Eastern Europe, preventive archaeology, in the modern sense of the term, did not exist prior to the 1990s, with different forms and practices of rescue archaeology being much more common. If one compares Eastern and Western rescue archaeology prior to the 1990s, the major point of resemblance was the fact that they all lacked clear and comprehensive heritage protection systems and practices. Every country had legislation that clearly defined and protected cultural heritage, but none of them had effective mechanisms, criteria and tools for efficient heritage protection, including research into endangered sites. To many it seemed somewhat logical that we were dealing with ‘normal’ research, albeit in extraordinary conditions, and that practices developed at academic institutions could also serve to rescue endangered heritage.

There is one further aspect to be considered when discussing the former socialist countries: that of the system of property and of funding. Under socialism, heritage development and heritage protection were understood to be a public good, in the public interest or public ‘property’, and both were financed from public funds. However, clear distinctions were made between the two and this frequently put heritage in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, it was given prominence as evidence of important processes and events in the creation of the nation and in national emancipation (for example); on the other hand, communist ideology had a very selective attitude towards heritage, promoting processes of social and economic development, industrialisation, transformation from an agricultural to an industrial economy, the construction of large-scale infrastructure, and so on. Where there was a lack of clear strategy and priority in heritage protection, rescue archaeology was indeed a process of negotiation between stakeholders, frequently on a case-by-case basis. These negotiations were, in most cases, *ad hoc* and took place at all levels of administration and government, from national to local, depending on the scale and



importance of development and heritage. It would be wrong to think that there were no regulations within this process. Laws and other subsidiary instruments did exist, but they were rarely precise and executive in their powers; as such, they were subject to differing interpretations.

Funds for rescue works were exclusively public and, in most cases, it was up to the heritage protection institutes to secure them. The rationale behind this was simple: the state (or local state body) was simultaneously the developer and 'protector' of heritage, and so it was its job to secure the necessary funding. However, funding for protection (e.g. rescue excavations) did not come from the same funds as development. One rarely saw cases of developers funding (or at least part-funding) rescue archaeology. In the socialist system, this meant that the developer (a public organisation) was sometimes given additional (public) funds for rescue works directed by another public organisation. The only way to make this system work was through negotiation.

This system of rescue archaeology was clearly not very efficient. In spite of the long tradition of planned economy and development, it was very difficult to plan in advance the budget for rescuing hundreds of unexpected discoveries prior to and during construction work; moreover, these discoveries delayed construction and increased its cost. The outcome frequently came at the cost of archaeology, both heritage and practice: only limited rescue excavations were possible, emergency excavations during construction work were carried out very quickly, no restoration could be planned, etc. Archaeological staff were not really prepared and equipped for working in such circumstances.

To illustrate this, let us turn to a case from Slovenia. While, according to several criteria, this country was the most developed of all the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and has a rather efficient and modern system of preventive archaeology today, the situation 30 or so years ago did not differ much from that in other Eastern European countries.

Between 1985 and 1989 around 250 rescue excavations and projects were carried out – an average of 50 per year (Turk 1991: 7). Twenty-five years later (2010–2014) the number of preventive projects had increased tenfold, i.e. to around 2,500 projects of varying sizes per year. The difference is even larger when the excavated areas or the funds allocated to preventive research are taken into account. This huge increase is the direct result of the implementation of the Valletta Convention and its two major requirements: a) that preventive archaeology be integrated into spatial planning processes and b) that the 'polluter pays' principle be applied. I have no precise data for other countries but, by rule of thumb, one might expect an increase of at least 500% in most of the former socialist countries of Central Europe as a whole.

This change happened over the course of 10 to 15 years and has had considerable consequences for all aspects of archaeology and archaeological practice. However, not all the countries followed (or were in a position to follow) the Slovenian example.



The crucial point here is how preventive archaeological research is incorporated into spatial planning processes and, even more importantly, how this is implemented in practice. If prior evaluations of archaeological potential are only desk-based and not tested in the field, then a great deal of preventive archaeology's potential is lost. At this point, it is difficult to classify countries according to the degree to which archaeology participates in spatial planning. Some countries are definitely not very successful in this and, in my personal experience, countries like Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina are certainly among the least successful. The situation is much better in Central European countries such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, and in the Baltic countries.

### **New subjects in preventive archaeology**

There is one very simple empirical tool for examining whether preventive archaeology is well integrated into spatial planning policy and processes: the number of archaeologists and other experts involved, and the types of economic and legal status held by entities professionally engaged in preventive archaeology.

Any substantial increase in the number of projects required during spatial and development planning has only been made possible through a corresponding increase in the number of practitioners and/or archaeological jobs (both, in public or private organisation). This effect can be seen throughout Europe and not only in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

Another criterion (the types of economic/business participation in preventive archaeology) also shows a direct correlation between an increase in the involvement of preventive archaeology in the planning process and an increase in the heterogeneity of business arrangements. Empirical comparisons for the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe demonstrate that markets in preventive archaeological services are stronger or more developed in countries where adequate consideration is given to archaeological heritage in spatial planning. Of course, this should not be taken as a rule: INRAP in France and its system of preventive archaeology is clear exception, but here we are talking about a very different tradition of the state and of the administration of public assets to that present in most of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

However, making preventive archaeological work subject to market forces and competition has a number of negative effects. Two closely connected effects are listed below:

- a) increased precarity and the widespread phenomenon of low-paid archaeological jobs in preventive projects. This should not be seen as the logical outcome of an increased number of archaeologists but of other factors, including, first and foremost, the uncontrolled liberalisation of the market in heritage services and a lack of regulation on fair competition;

- b) heritage as an ‘undesirable’ by-product of development. The general pressure to lower costs in all aspects of development also applies to preventive work, with developers opting to paying for the ‘cheapest archaeology’ rather than the ‘best possible archaeology’. Heritage is seen as an obstacle rather than an asset and, since it is legally protected, the attitude of the ‘lesser evil’ dominates.

## **Quality control, standards and good practice**

In order to improve this situation, one needs a state prepared to deploy its mechanisms of imposing regulations, responsibilities and sanctions. Preventive archaeology, by virtue of operating during the planning development phases, requires regulations and standards that are more detailed than those applied to rescue and salvage intervention. In other words, while rescue and salvage archaeology deals exclusively with self-evident sites or sites newly discovered by chance, preventive archaeology is first and foremost about the archaeological potential of areas and sites for which development plans have been drawn up. Evidence needs to be provided for the sites to a certain level of probability, and these sites also need to be accurately mapped; this is in order to prescribe further steps for their protection and, where necessary, provide the basis for excavation. In addition, preventive practice today includes several new methods and techniques of sampling and testing, which needed validation and acceptance before becoming widely used.

There is a further reason for more detailed quality control standards and procedures. Compared to the pre-La Valletta period, when there were very few (if any) explicit standards in rescue archaeology, the ‘standards’ that did exist were derived from academic field practice and there were only a limited number of organisations permitted to undertake rescue work, post-La Valletta has seen marked changes to the situation. The large increase in a number of preventive research projects has inevitably generated a demand for more archaeologists, who now appear in different forms of organisation and legal status. This large increase in the number of archaeologists engaged in preventive research necessitates the introduction of quality control and standards in order to secure the required level of research quality. This is currently not yet the case in many European countries – many of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe included. While one might find documents designated as ‘standards’, most of them are very general and incapable of meeting the demand for efficient mechanisms capable of securing quality.

## **New technologies**

Accompanying the increase in the number of research projects is an increase in the development and implementation of new technologies in archaeological research,

with the most significant 'decentralisation' or 'democratisation' occurring in the last few decades. While the level of technology used in archaeological field research and analysis was relatively modest prior to the 1990s, particularly in research and rescue projects undertaken by regional and local organisations, the situation is very different today. It used to be the case that only the top academic institutes and national museums had access to costly technological equipment and analysis (although the general underdevelopment of many former socialist countries meant that even this level was frequently not comparable to that seen in the West). The situation is radically different today. Rapid development and the fall in the prices of computing technologies, IT and technologies for the automated recording of various types of data have made new technological tools accessible to virtually anyone. This has, of course, speeded up most aspects of fieldwork and recording. In many former socialist countries, the new technologies have been adopted and implemented more quickly by smaller private organisations than by the large institutes. In fact, new technology has not only equipped smaller enterprises; it has also boosted the creation of new specialised niches requiring the services of archaeologists and other experts.

### **Knowledge derived from preventive archaeology**

As this introductory paper draws to a close, I would like to focus on the question of the extent to which the efforts of preventive archaeology as a whole actually contribute to our knowledge of the past. If the question of the quality of preventive archaeology and the heritage it saves is necessary for understanding the relevance of archaeology to our society, the question of the extent to which preventive archaeology contributes to a knowledge of past is the flip side of the coin and actually addresses the issue of the coherence of the discipline of archaeology.

It is beyond doubt that the large increase in field projects across our countries, indeed all over Europe and the rest of the world, has led to an accumulation of large quantities of archaeological evidence – quantities that are probably higher by several orders of magnitude than 30 years ago. One also thinks of the large increase in a number of skilled professionals able to cope efficiently with complex field projects and sites – another fact that appears indisputable at first glance. However, evidence alone does not automatically mean new knowledge or even new heritage. Both need to be properly constructed and contextualised.

One can hardly escape the feeling that the potential of this mass of new evidence is far from being fully exploited – and the same applies to the potential generated by the large increase in the number of archaeologists. I agree that it is not easy to estimate the volume of new knowledge of the past produced by preventive archaeology

in the last three decades, or to say with certainty what kind of knowledge has been produced. Let us imagine instead what an increase of this scale would have meant for ancient history if, for example, 10,000 new fragments of ancient texts from the Mediterranean had been discovered in the same short space of time. The parallel is an exaggerated one, for sure, but it does clearly illustrate the problem. There are many cases where long linear projects, for example motorways, have radically changed regional chronologies and our knowledge of settlement patterns and past land use; there are also numerous cases where preventive projects have discovered completely unknown aspects of the archaeological past. We should not use this as the measure of success, but it does point to the way in which archaeological evidence and archaeological epistemology are different to historiography. In fact, historians too would need a century or more to properly analyse such massive quantities of new evidence.

Several authors have nevertheless observed that the quality of publications and reports does not match the potential of the excavated sites. A great deal of the data discovered ends in site reports and descriptive catalogues and is never studied in more detail. Moreover, the regulations, standards, manuals and similar documents regarding site reports and field-recording lead to the mass production of very simplified texts aimed at fulfilling the requirements of those very regulations. The pressure to conduct field research and produce a field report as quickly as possible undoubtedly reduces the creativity of archaeology, turning it into something of a conveyor-belt process. It is probably here that the coherence of the discipline of archaeology is in greatest danger – and here that we need to invest more effort in the future. We have to accept that the increase in preventive projects has led to archaeology becoming a heavily ‘data-driven’ discipline. This fact is still not fully recognised, but it does require very careful reflection. Thousands of cases of poor-quality and over-simplified interpretations, in the long run, undermine the role and relevance of archaeology in the public mind.

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