

Jünger's Concept of Revolution: The Worker and Strategies of Societal Change

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Povzetek

Članek preučuje analizo družbenih sprememb, kot je podana v knjigi *Delavec* Ernsta Jüngerja, pri čemer se osredotoča na dialektiko med buržoazijo in delavskim razredom. Članek skozi kritično branje Jüngerjevega pojmovnega okvira raziskuje načine, kako meščanski red s sredstvi vrednot in institucij omejuje radikalno transformativno moč delavstva. Glavni poudarek članka je na mehanizmih, ki ohranjajo hegemonijo posebnega načina mišljenja, in na možnostih njegovega preseganja. Izhajajoč iz Jüngerjeve teze, da resnične spremembe terjajo radikalno zavrnitev obstoječih paradigem, nato analiziramo njegovo pojmovanje »postave« (*Gestalt*) kot ključne za razumevanje novega družbenega reda. Članek pokaže, da Jüngerjeva teorija, čeprav je nastala v specifičnem zgodovinskem kontekstu, ponuja relevanten okvir za razumevanje sodobnih oblik gospostva in možnosti njihove subverzije.

Ključne besede: Ernst Jünger, delavci, buržoazija, Gestalt, hegemonija, družbeni razredi

Summary

This article examines Ernst Jünger's analysis of societal change as presented in his work *The Worker*, with particular focus on the dialectic between the bourgeoisie and working class. Through a critical reading of Jünger's conceptual framework, we explore how the bourgeois order, through its values and institutions, constrains the radical transformative potential of the worker. The primary focus of the study is on the mechanisms that sustain the hegemony of a particular mode of thought and the possibilities for overcoming it.

Building on Jünger's thesis that genuine change requires a radical rejection of existing paradigms, we analyze his concept of "Gestalt" as a key notion for understanding a new social order. The article demonstrates how Jünger's theory, though developed in a specific historical context, provides a relevant framework for comprehending contemporary forms of domination and their potential subversion.

Keywords: Ernst Jünger, workers, bourgeoisie, Gestalt, hegemony, social classes

Introduction

In this article we aim to show where Ernst Jünger identifies the possibility of a new society and what is necessary to bring about real societal change. Our main goal is reconstructing Jünger's strategy for bringing about societal changes by focusing on the class dialectic as described in his most significant philosophical work, *The Worker* (*Der Arbeiter*).

Elliot Y. Neaman, one of the leading researchers on Jünger, notes that some post-war commentators saw this period in Jünger as Nietzschean, and therefore interpreted his early work as an expressionistic, juvenile rebellion against the moral hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie in the interwar period.¹ One can discern the influence of Nietzsche in Jünger's thought primarily through the motif of the revaluation of all values, an influence that will become more evident in the following chapter. Jünger made a significant contribution to the elucidation of the mechanisms of class domination, going well beyond the classical Marxist thesis. He shifted the focus from material domination, i.e., the exploitation of one class by another through control of capital and the means of production, to the underlying conceptual frameworks imposed by the dominant order. In *The Worker*, Jünger sees society as divided into two major classes, with a particular dialectic arising between them, where one debilitates the other, imposing its own categories upon it. Although Jünger never explicitly outlined his conception of dialectics, through a reconstruction of the processes described in the aforementioned work, we will attempt to shed light on what is at stake. In the context of the bourgeois order—where the prevailing classes are the bourgeoisie (*Bürger*) and the workers (*Arbeiter*)—the dominant features of society are the rule of reason and morality. These serve as filters through which much of what the worker *is* is mediated and redirected in ways that are unnatural to him. More specifically, the raw experience of the human being is directly steered in a direction that suits the interests of the

1 Elliot Y. Neaman, *A Dubious Past: Ernst Jünger and the Politics of Literature after Nazism*, p. 7.

bourgeois class, with the aim of preserving the existing order (an issue we will examine in greater detail later in this article).

Our thesis is that in *The Worker*, Jünger develops a distinctive dialectical conception of social transformation in which the oppressed class (as a new historical subject) can realize its revolutionary potential only through a radical rejection of all values and conceptual frameworks of the existing order. This includes not only its moral categories and economic structures, but, above all, the fundamental concepts through which it understands itself and the surrounding world. True transformation, for Jünger, requires not merely a change in political structures, but a fundamental reconfiguration of thought and affect. Like a military commander, Jünger seeks to enact this project through the affirmation of *Gestalt* as a form of organic totality that transcends the individualism and reductionism of the bourgeois epoch.

The relevance of Jünger's insight into this particular mechanism of change lies in the fact that it does not pertain solely to transformations occurring within the political sphere, or to the specific social classes mentioned here, but rather to the mechanism of social transformation in general. From his work, one discerns the suggestion that the ruling class tends toward the preservation of the existing order, and that this tendency is always present behind propaganda, imposed conceptual frameworks, and systems of morality. Imposed social standards, such as bourgeois morality and an unquestioning faith in reason, become chains that bind the oppressed class, preventing it from revolting and shaping a society that reflects its own interests. The imposition of behavioral norms, values, and modes of action, all with the aim of continued exploitation and the extension of unfreedom, remains evident in contemporary society, although in a somewhat different form. In one society, the dominant values may resemble those Jünger describes, while in another, they may appear entirely different. Yet what unites them all are the mechanisms of control that serve to secure the class position of the privileged.

Class Division in *The Worker*

Since we stated in the introduction that Jünger's theory differs from the Marxist one in that it relates class domination primarily to the imposition of conceptual frameworks, we will now focus on illuminating the social dynamic between the classes. One social class exploits another by peacefully integrating it into a system suited to its own interests and disabling its capacity for resistance, redirecting its

potential by all means available with the aim of preserving the existing class order. This occurs chiefly through the dominant class's establishment of morality and "reason". As David Pan observes, "the critique of reason is actually a critique of a specific culture's claim to universal value."² Although morality, the imposition of reason and related values originate in the subjective sphere, in this arrangement they lay claim to universality. One social class imposes upon another the patterns of behavior that serve to uphold and safeguard the existing order. For the bourgeois class, the supreme value, against which all others are measured, is its own security, while reason and morality constitute its two foundational principles. We maintain that these patterns can also be observed in many earlier forms of society, as well as in (contemporary) capitalism, where economic profit stands as the principal value. What is characteristic of such a social condition is that all other values are measured in relation to the foundational one.

For Jünger, the difference between a bourgeois and a worker does not amount only to a difference in social class. It is, first and foremost, an important difference in the way of being, and this is another point where Jünger shifts the classical Marxist paradigm. He comes close to treating different class figures as archetypes of different kinds of human beings who confront one another in class struggle. His use of concepts is almost strategic, which is unsurprising given that he was, above all, a soldier. Since he held that it was necessary to think outside imposed patterns, this form of essentialism is, in fact, a form of resistance. It stands in radical contrast to the reductionist tendencies of bourgeois reason, which he opposed, and the use of such a conceptual apparatus directly serves the purpose of social transformation. While he views the figure of the bourgeois (*Bürger*) as living under the illusion of security and individual autonomy—an illusion, since war or the collapse of the economic order may occur—the worker (*Arbeiter*) stands in direct relation to the "fundamental forces of history": "Namely, that the worker stands in a relation to elemental powers of whose bare presence the bourgeois never had an inkling."³ Consequently, Jünger holds that by the essence of his being, the worker is capable of freedom completely different from that of which the bourgeois is capable of, and that his claims, "which he holds in readiness,"⁴ greatly exceed those of a single class, and are "far more comprehensive, far more significant, far more redoubtable."⁵ Above all, Jünger sees the bourgeois as someone for whom the greatest value in life is personal security, therefore lacking any ideals exceeding

2 David Pan, "The Sovereignty of the Individual in Ernst Jünger's *The Worker*," p. 74.

3 Ernst Jünger, *The Worker: Dominion and Form*, p. 10.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

this kind of personal security, which entails both the security of his life and, more broadly, the security of his class, i.e., economic position.

Hence, the freedoms of which the two figures are capable of differ radically, for the bourgeois is incapable of overcoming his fetishization of security. Something similar can be observed in contemporary society, where many reject societal change out of fear for their own security. The bourgeois is blind to the paradox of his freedom being imposed from above because he treats freedom and security as synonyms. Furthermore, those in positions of power then promote 'peace and stability', often emphasizing an unfavorable geopolitical situation, fomenting intolerance against neighboring countries and claiming the existence of various 'external and internal enemies' as a means of affording themselves the status of some stabilizing factor without which the entire society would be under threat, with this logic culminating in the appeal to the highest ideal of the bourgeois, namely security. Those in power establish themselves as actual guarantors of freedom, and because for a bourgeois there is nothing more important than security (now synonymous with freedom), the ceding of territory, the demolishing of the economy, and many other things become acceptable due to this view of "stability".

According to Pan, Jünger finds problematic that "the bourgeois subject was always hemmed in and constrained by a complex set of rules and conventions that governed the subject's actions and thoughts in a way that made nineteenth-century bourgeois society highly conventionalized."⁶ He further observes that "this conventionality of bourgeois society becomes the object of critique for Jünger because he sees the bourgeois as alienated from an underlying reality of violence and elemental forces."⁷ When speaking of the figure of the bourgeois, Jünger remarks that for him, society is defined by reason and morality as its two highest principles,⁸ such that anything which does not conform to the prescribed patterns is automatically disqualified to the advantage of what is conventionally accepted and presented as universal. He notes that this leads to the repression of the "elemental" into the realm of what is deemed delusion, idle fantasy, or malice, and thus is relegated to the domain of meaninglessness.⁹

When speaking of the elemental, which is closely related to the natural dimension mentioned earlier, Jünger refers to the raw experience of the human being—raw in the sense of being unprocessed and unfiltered by what is deemed socially

6 Pan, "The Sovereignty of the Individual," p. 73.

7 *Ibid.*

8 Jünger, *The Worker*, p. 11.

9 *Ibid.*

‘rational’ and acceptable. His idea is that, through the imposition of what is considered socially acceptable, many aspects of our personality, our drives, and everything that makes us who we are is suppressed. More concretely, he holds that the elemental has a dual source: on the one hand, it stems from the dangers present in the world, “just as the dead calm sea can hide danger within itself,”¹⁰ and on the other, it arises from the human heart, “which yearns for play and adventures, for hate and love, for triumphs and crashes, which feels the need for danger just as much as for security, and to which a condition of fundamental security appears rightly incomplete.”¹¹ On the one side, then, we have the morality of the bourgeoisie, grounded in security as its fundamental value, while on the other, there is the actual human being with all of their “irrational” passions, drives, and desires—everything that escapes the rationally constructed discourse of the bourgeois class.

It is precisely here that we find the opposing poles of the dialectic Jünger invokes: the worker, with his raw human experience, stands on one side as thesis, while the bourgeois order, with its imposed conceptual framework, forms the antithesis. The worldview of one social class (the bourgeois order), in being imposed upon the other (the workers), severs a significant portion of the potential and power of that second class, casting out all elements that contradict the bourgeois worldview, thereby figuratively castrating the worker and rendering him incapable of freedom. It turns out that bourgeois morality functions as a social dogma, one that the class which upholds it does not recognize as such, but instead takes to be the absolute standard of what is deemed proper: “The bourgeois almost succeeded in convincing the adventurous heart that danger does not exist at all and that an economic law governs the world and its history.”¹² The worker thus finds himself imprisoned within imposed conceptual structures and behavioral patterns which must be suspended to make room for a reencounter with authentic, raw experience. Taking all this into account, we see that Jünger’s conception does not aim at reconciliation between opposing sides, but rather at annihilation on the conceptual plane, so that the worker may reach an authentic experience akin to Husserl’s pre-reflexive *Lebenswelt* from which a society proportionate to that authentic experience may be built.

In Jünger’s vision of historical transformation, the bourgeois appears as the saboteur of the worker’s historical mission, systematically shaping the worker’s worldview to prevent the awakening of his authentic potential. The worker, as the bearer

10 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

12 *Ibid.*

of the new order, does not exist in a pure form: he is always already cloaked in the attire of the bourgeois, which conceals his true nature. Jünger's key thesis is as follows:

This shows how important it is to distinguish between the worker as a nascent power on which the fate of the country is based, and the garbs in which the bourgeois disguised this power in order that it would serve him as a puppet in his artificial game. This is a distinction between rise and fall.¹³

This metaphor unveils a deep ontological struggle: while the worker incarnates historical energy, the bourgeois domesticates it, directing the worker's potential toward the maintenance of the existing social order, where the worker remains oppressed. The members of one class—the bourgeois citizenry—do not constrain the members of another class—the workers—with physical chains, but through a conceptual framework: imposing their own hierarchy of values as universal, wherein security, contractual justice and compromise become the standards against which all else is measured. Consequently, the bourgeois redirects the worker to pursue his demands through reforms, because revolution would threaten security and would be incompatible with the rational principles taken as unquestionable in the bourgeois world. Here, Jünger anticipates modern mechanisms of hegemony: the bourgeois does not rule by force, but by producing the illusion that no alternative exists.

Resistance and the Possibility of a New Society

In light of this, Jünger emphasizes that what is crucial for achieving change is precisely that the worker—as member of the oppressed class—must cease to think and act according to the patterns imposed by the ruling class, the bourgeoisie:

Only then will he reveal himself as the true mortal enemy of society, when he will refuse to think, to feel, and to be in its forms. This, however, happens when he realizes that he has so far been all too modest in his claims and that the bourgeois taught him to desire only what appears desirable to the bourgeois.¹⁴

This idea is particularly striking because society is structured in such a way that change aligned with what truly belongs to the worker is institutionally impossible. Bourgeois institutions are designed to integrate the worker into the system,

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

placing him where he has no rights or influence and cannot threaten the system, all while maintaining the illusion of freedom and the possibility of change through institutional appeal—with these institutions failing to fulfill their purported function. In a situation where institutions do not perform their duties, what becomes necessary is for the worker to take his freedom into his own hands and become the measure himself. That is not to say that “his existence requires interpretation”; for whenever this is the case, the worker is always interpreted through his or her *economic value*. Jünger targets the view of economic value as the worker’s highest virtue: “In everything thought and said on this matter so far, one detects the attempt of a calculating mind to transform fate into a quantity accessible to calculation.”¹⁵ He points out how the ideal of a world ruled by reason and virtue (in the previously mentioned bourgeois sense) coincides with the economic utopia of a world reduced entirely to the economy: “What is inescapable is the fact that, within this world of exploiters and exploited, no dimension is possible which is not decided by a supreme court of the economic.”¹⁶

In this vein, Jünger believes no movement can avoid sinking into the mire of self-interest, and that there is no position from which a breakthrough stands a chance of success, “Because the economy in itself, the economic interpretation of the world, forms the center of this cosmos, and it is the economy which acts as a gravitational force on each of its parts.”¹⁷ As Marcus Paul Bullock notes:

Jünger’s most radical proposal denies that there can be real freedom in work pursued as an economic motivation. He calls this insight the great secret his book has to reveal, for “in the first place, the economy is not a force that can grant freedom, and in the second, an economic purpose has no capacity to reach as far as the elements of freedom.”¹⁸

Accordingly, Jünger stresses that his idea does not imply ignoring the economy or abandoning the field of struggle, but rather intensifying the struggle to its utmost, though not in line with the rules dictated by the economy, but under a higher law of combat that takes precedence even over economic dictates.¹⁹ The precondition for such a struggle is precisely the aforementioned renunciation of behavior and value systems imposed by the other class, including the cessation of acting within them, so that the sphere of freedom might shift away from the

15 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

17 *Ibid.*

18 Marcus P. Bullock, “Flight Forward: The World of Ernst Jünger’s Worker,” p. 465.

19 Jünger, *The Worker*, pp. 18–19.

domain of economics. Otherwise, every assault from within the bourgeois order "can, consequently, be only a superficial attack, leading to a sharpened expression of bourgeois values."²⁰

Since we have established that it is not enough simply to stop acting within imposed patterns, but that one must also cease *thinking* within them, we now turn to the *conceptual framework* Jünger develops in opposition to bourgeois reductionism.

The Conceptual Framework as a Form of Resistance

In *The Worker*, Jünger introduces the notion of *Gestalt* (configuration or form), a concept from which Heidegger later draws inspiration for his own idea of *Ge-stell*. As Wolfgang Kittler points out, there is a number of parallels in both the arguments and the language in *The Worker* and Heidegger's essay "Questioning after Technology."²¹ The concept of *Gestalt* derives from psychology, with Wolfgang Köhler being the most influential figure in its development (with his book *Psychologische Probleme*). When discussing the nature of Gestalt psychology, Köhler points out that it did the opposite of what was expected from such a young science. While the general rule would be to first consider the simplest facts,²² the Gestalt psychologists disregarded it, and rather tried to look for general rules of phenomena:

First, they said, we have to inspect perceptual scenes quite impartially, to try to find in these scenes such facts as strike us as remarkable, if possible to explain their nature, to compare it with the nature of other interesting facts, and to see whether, in this fashion, we can gradually discover general rules which hold for many phenomena.²³

Therefore, in Gestalt psychology we can see a manner similar to that of Jünger—emphasis on the structure which precedes the individual. Kittler points out that "although a gestalt always consists of a multiplicity of elements, it is a whole that is more than the sum of its parts."²⁴ Thus, Kittler concludes:

As such, gestalten are the primary givens of any perception of the world. This almost axiomatic statement implies that all those schools of psychology that try to split the functions of the psyche into primary elements are

20 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

21 Wolf Kittler, "From Gestalt to Ge-Stell: Martin Heidegger Reads Ernst Jünger," p. 79.

22 Wolfgang Köhler, *The Task of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 36.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

24 Kittler, "From Gestalt to Ge-Stell," pp. 82–83.

bound to miss their target. By studying an artificial mosaic of disconnected atoms, they cannot grasp their object, which is, by definition, a field of already organized and structured wholes.²⁵

Both Heidegger, in his early analysis of *Dasein*, but also in his late philosophy, and Jünger, were heavily influenced by this. Julian Young points out that “Heidegger says that like Junger’s *Gestalt*, being is ‘transcendence’, that is, ‘the meta-physical’[...] It transcends beings, is ‘above’ the ‘physical’, in the way in which the visual field transcends ‘the appearance of objects’.”²⁶ For Jünger, *Gestalt* is key to understanding the new epoch: “From the moment when form shapes one’s experience, everything becomes ‘form’ [*Gestalt*]. Form is thus not a new dimension to be discovered in addition to those already known; rather to a new gaze the world appears as a theatre of forms and their interrelations.”²⁷ This is not an abstract thesis, but a revolutionary shift in perspective away from the mechanical view, characteristic of the bourgeois era, which sees society as a sum of individuals, toward an understanding of organic wholes with their own internal dynamism. When Jünger speaks of the figures of the *bourgeois* and the *worker*, he does not conceive of them merely as sociological categories but as *Gestalten*—forms that transcend the mere sum of their parts. Since he sees the abandonment of bourgeois patterns of thought as necessary for transformation, the forging of such a concept is already a step in the direction of a critique of 19th-century bourgeois reductionism. Thus, Jünger criticizes the bourgeois epoch for its tendency toward reductionism, where everything is reduced to the sum of its parts:

Admittedly, a part is just as far from being “form” as a sum of parts can result in a “form”. [...] A man is more than the sum of the atoms, limbs, organs and fluids of which he consists; a marriage is more than man and wife, a family more than man, woman and child. A friendship is more than two men, and a people is more than can be expressed by the results of a census or by any number of political polls.²⁸

This directly opposes liberal individualism, which views society as a simple aggregation of individuals. For Jünger, the bourgeois represents the paralysis of totality—a person who fails to recognize the larger whole and lives under the illusion of autonomy. In contrast, the worker is a figure acting within a *Gestalt*, embracing its technical-organizational character. For Jünger, however, the individual is not to be overlooked, nor does it “melt away” into the collective. On the

25 *Ibid.*, p. 83.

26 Julian Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*, p. 11.

27 Jünger, *The Worker*, p. 21.

28 *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.

contrary, he views bourgeois society as the site of such a "melting into" through imposed conventions, while on the other side there lies a more fundamental experience of the individual precisely in the relinquishing of these imposed conventions. As Pan notes: "The worker type does not result from a simple setting of constraints on the individual but from a focus on the individual as the sole source of sovereign authority."²⁹

When Jünger writes in *The Worker* that the individual has a "right to form" alongside "stones, plants, animals, and stars,"³⁰ he is pointing to a fundamental aspect of existence: nothing is merely the sum of its parts. In an era where bourgeois thought reduces man to a rational individual and society to a contractual marketplace of interests, Jünger discovers that the essence of life lies in the *organic whole* that surpasses its constituent elements. The individual is not a slave to his capabilities but the bearer of something greater—a *Gestalt* that situates him within a cosmic and historical order. Jünger's *Gestalt* is not merely a social concept, but a mode of being. Just as a stone has structure and a star its course, man exists only as an organized totality: "As form, the 'individual' encompasses more than the sum of his powers and capacities; he is deeper than what he can imagine it in his deepest thoughts, and more powerful than what he can express in his most powerful acts."³¹

Thus, through his conceptual use of *Gestalt*, Jünger tries to shift the bourgeoisie paradigm. While the bourgeoisie views man as an independent unit, Jünger shows that every individuality is always already embedded in a broader structure—be it the family, the people, war, or technological civilization. As Vincent Blok writes: "The gestalt is not of this world, rather presents itself only in the representation through the type. Jünger thus also speaks in *The Worker* of the type of the worker as representative of the gestalt of the worker."³² Moreover, the *Gestalt* cannot be seen as a being that reveals itself entirely in the world; rather, it discloses itself as something ontologically other.³³ Though in some sense immanent, *Gestalt* is also transcendent, never fully revealing itself, except through its typical representatives.

In other words, *Gestalt* is a figure that never fully discloses itself. It is not simply the sum of its parts, nor can it be understood by merely analyzing its components. Its individual elements are representative of the *Gestalt* as its variations. Such a

29 Pan, "The Sovereignty of the Individual," p. 67.

30 Jünger, *The Worker*, p. 23.

31 *Ibid.*

32 Vincent Blok, *Ernst Jünger's Philosophy of Technology*, p. 15.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

conception indeed points toward an underlying Platonism in Jünger's thought, where *Gestalt* resembles the Platonic *idea* which no analysis (*diaíresis*) can exhaust. Jünger's conceptual framework thus already constitutes a means of overcoming reductionism—and a tool for social transformation.

Conclusion

In this article we have analyzed Ernst Jünger's vision of social transformation through the lens of his key work, *The Worker*, focusing on the dialectic between the bourgeois class (*Bürger*) and the working class (*Arbeiter*). The core of Jünger's insight lies in the recognition that the bourgeois dominates not only through economic exploitation but also by imposing conceptual frameworks, universalizing his moral values, rationality, and security. The worker thus becomes a puppet of the system, incapable of recognizing his own power. However, Jünger points to the path of resistance: the worker must stop thinking and acting within the frameworks imposed by the bourgeois order, which entails rejecting the illusion that change can be achieved within existing institutions. Jünger's work ought to be read along these precise lines: the manner in which he thinks and employs concepts already constitutes a form of resistance and a paving of the way toward the kind of transformation he envisions.

Informed by his experience of World War I, Jünger realized that technological progress and its dominance cannot be stopped. Simply put, if one social group were to ignore technology, it would be destroyed by another that uses it—one cannot oppose a tank with a club. Thus, technological advancement cannot be halted, but it can be subordinated to a higher aim, so that it is not the ultimate measure. The same holds for the economy. Accordingly, Jünger insists that his idea does not call for the ignoring of economics or withdrawal from that field, but rather for the intensification of the struggle—not on terms dictated by the economy, but by a higher law of struggle that overrides it.³⁴ As Karel Nawratek observes, Jünger's conception allows us to envision alternative narratives outside the hegemonic, capitalist-reductive logic of “being-financial equivalent-other being” as the basis for all translation and transaction.³⁵ In view of that, Nawratek claims:

It is perfectly possible to build minor narratives rooted in religious or cultural spaces, in spaces of biological reproduction, spaces of love and memory, and so on... These alternative micro-stories (again—in an

34 Jünger, *The Worker*, p. 19.

35 Karel Nawratek, *Total Urban Mobilisation: Ernst Jünger and the Post-Capitalist City*, p. 34.

abundant multiplicity!) build new networks and create contra-hegemonic relationships.³⁶

Jünger's analysis is thus not merely a critique of bourgeois society in the 20th century, but rather a universal schema of mechanisms of domination, equally relevant to contemporary neoliberal capitalism. His thought indicates that true change does not emerge through reforms within the system, but through a radical overcoming of its foundations. In this sense, *The Worker* is not only a philosophical manifesto but a strategic guide for liberation from every form of conceptual and material hegemony.

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36 *Ibid.*